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Indiana City Attorneys: A Conflict of Interests
He shall have the management, charge, and control of the law
business of said city and for each branch of its government.'
This broad statutory charge to the Indiana city attorney evolved
in an era when the activities of municipal government were, in compari-
son to the varied and pervasive municipal programs of today,2 fairly
circumscribed. Today's city is an increasingly complex entity with a
growing potential for friction between the segments of municipal
government.' As legal counsel for the city and for each branch of its
government, the Indiana city attorney must recognize and deal with
the potential conflicts of interest4 inherent in his position.
This note looks first at conflicts growing out of the interplay be-
tween the broad statutory command of the city attorney and the "strong
mayor" form of municipal government which exists in Indiana. It sug-
lIND. CODE § 18-1-6-13 (Burns 1974).2Indiana has by implication adopted Cooley's classic definition of the municipal
corporation as
a perfect public corporation, established under and by virtue of a sovereign act of
legislation, uniting the people and land within a prescribed boundary into a body
corporate and politic for the purposes of local and self-government, and invested
with the powers necessary therefor.
R. COOLEY, HANBOOK or THE LAw or MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 6 & 7 (1914). See
State v. Brubeck, 204 Ind. 1, 5, 170 N.E. 81, 82 (1932) (establishing that the state is
not a municipal corporation). This legal definition tells the city attorney what kind of
an entity he represents, and it may suggest to him the possibilities of city government, but
it does not answer the question of how these possibilities have been realized.3The city's increased responsibility for the quality of life, and the effect of this
responsibility on the city, have been recognized by urban experts for at least 40 years. See
A. BRO3MAGE, INTRODUCTION To MUNICIPAL GovEx NT AND A Dw NisTRATION 44-54, 555
(1957); C. KNEIER, CrrY GOVE .aIENT IN TMa UNITED STATES 20-25 (1934). The discussion
continues today. See Alford, The Bureaucratization of Urban Government, in SocIAr. CHANE
AND URBAN PoIrrIcs: READINGS 262 (D. Gordon ed. 1973); Banovetz, The City: Forces
of Change, in MANAiNG THm MODERN CITY 24-27 (J. Banovetz ed. 1971).
For a look at the role of the legal department in urban government, see BROMrAE,
supra, at 555; Kennedy, in MANAGiNo TH MODERN CITY, supra, at 403-06; 3 E. McQurmLm,
THE LAw or MuNxICI.A CoRPoR.AIONS § 12.51 (3d rev. ed. 1973); W. WINTER, TBn URBAN
PoLITY 131-34 (1969).
4 1The note will not discuss conflicts which arise as a result of the practice of permitting
attorneys to engage in private practice while acting as city attorney.
Indiana is not unique in its use of part-time city attorneys. Probably most American
cities under 50,000 in population employ part-time legal counsel. See Kennedy, Legal Services
and Regulatory Procedures, in MANAGING =a MODEMN Crr 403 (J. Banovetz ed; 1971).
One author has suggested that the practice of hiring several part-time attorneys instead
of a single full-time attorney is one of the reasons for what he considers the "inadequacy"
of legal talent currently available to cities. W. WiNTRa, THE URaN PoLnz. 131-34 (1969).
This note suggests, however, that employment of one attorney to represent all segments
of government causes problems not considered by Winter.
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gests the need for a redefinition of the role of the city attorney, based
on a forthright recognition that he must in practice act as the legal arm
of the executive branch of municipal government. This note will then
analyze the ethical problems' posed by the city attorney's position and
suggest a possible reinterpretation of the Code of Professional Ethics.
THE IMPACT OF THE STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
By adopting a "strong mayor" form of municipal government,
Indiana has made its mayors both the titular and effective leaders of
its cities. The Indiana mayor in cities of all classes possesses the fol-
lowing powers: (1) power to appoint and remove upper-level adminis-
trative personnel; (2) power to veto the actions of the legislative branch
of the city; and (3) power to supervise, prepare, and submit the city
budget.6 These are the signs of a "strong mayor" government.7 More-
5Lawyers and their ethical problems in general have been the topic of much recent
concern. See, e.g., Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of
Boston Lawyers, 9 SurFoLx L. REv. 66 (1974); Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of
Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. BAR. J. 331 (1974); Flynn, Webster & Swartz, Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility in California, 7 Sw. L. R~v. 603 (1975); Hood,
Renewed Emphasis on Professional Responsibility, 35 LA. L. R.v. 719 (1975); Poirier,
The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541 (1974);
Symposium, The Law, the Bar and Public Virtue, 55 Cma. BAR REc. 1 (Spec. Centennial
Issue 1974); Symposium, Law, Lawyers and Ethics: A Challenge to the Profession, 23
D. PAUL L. Rav. 633 (1974); Symposium, Legal Ethics, 48 L.A. BAR J. 403 (1973);
Symposium, Legal Ethics, 12 SAN D O L. REv. 245 (1975); Teschner, Lawyer Morality,
38 GEo. WASHa. L. Rav. 789 (1970); Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of
a Government Attorney, 18 MAiNrz L. Rav. 155 (1966); Wright, The Code of Professional
Responsibility, 14 ST. Louis L.J. 643 (1970); Note, Disciplinary Enforcement Problems
and Recommendations: An Indiana Survey, 48 IND. L.J. 134 (1970); Comment,
Ethics: Ethical Standards as Test of Evidence Admissabiity, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 148 (1974);
16 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 651 (1975).
61ND. CODE § 18-1-6-2 (Burns 1974).
Mayor-Powers and duties.-It shall be the duty of the mayor:
First. To cause the ordinances of the city and the laws of the state
to be executed and enforced.
Second. To communicate to the council at least once a year a statement
of the finances and general conditions of the city, and also such information in
relation to city affairs as he may be called upon to furnish from time to time.
Third. To make such recommendations in writing, by message to the
council, as he may deem expedient.
Fourth. To call special meetings of the council when the same shall be
expedient.
Fifth. To perform such duties of an executive or administrative character
as may be prescribed by law; and to exercise general supervision over subordinate
officers and be responsible for the good order and efficient government of the city.
Sixth. To fill by appointment vacancies for unexpired terms in the offices
of such city, except in case of vacancy in the office of mayor or councilman, as in
this act [18-1-1-1-18-1-24-1] hereinbefore provided.
Seventh. To appoint the heads of departments, as hereinbefore created,
in cities of the first, second, third and fourth classes, and to appoint, in cities
of the fifth class, a city marshal, chief of the fire force and street commissioner,
all of which appointees shall hold office until their successors are appointed and
[Vol. 51:783
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over, the mayor is required to "exercise general supervision over sub-
ordinate officers and be responsible for the good order and efficient
government of the city."8 Indiana's statutory scheme thus grants the
mayor wide-ranging authority with which to develop and implement
policy decisions,9 and to run city government.
Because of the dominant role which the mayor plays in guiding
and implementing policy and in administering the day-to-day affairs
of municipal government, it is essential that the mayor have a close
working relationship with the city attorney.1" Nearly all of the duties
of the city attorney, including representation of the city in all appeals,
qualified; and he shall make such other appointments as may be provided by law or
by the ordinances of any city: Provided, That the mayor may, at any time, suspend
or remove from office any or all of such heads of departments or other persons,
whether appointed by him or by any of his predecessors ....
Ninth. To approve or disapprove, in writing, within ten [10] days after
receiving the same, every ordinance or resolution of the common council, and he
shall transmit to such council within such time, a message, announcing such
approval or veto. In case of a veto, he shall state in writing his reason therefor,
and such resolution or ordinance shall not become operative unless the same is
passed over such veto by a two-thirds [M] vote of the common council:
Provided, That in ordinances appropriating money or levying a tax or taxes, the
mayor may approve or disapprove the separate items of such appropriation or
levy. In case of disapproval of any item or items, and approval of the remainder
of the ordinance, so much of the same as is approved shall be law and operative,
and those items which are disapproved shall not become law and operative unless
passed over by a two-thirds [%] vote as before provided.
Tenth. To call together the heads of departments provided for in this act,
except that of assessment and collection of taxes, for consultation and advice
upon the affairs of the city at least once a month, and to call on the heads of all
departments for reports, which it shall be their duty to submit in writing. Records
shall be kept of such meetings, and rules and regulations shall be adopted thereat
for the administration of the affairs of the city departments, not inconsistent with
any law or ordinance; and rules and regulations shall be adopted at such meet-
ings which shall prescribe a common and systematic method of ascertaining the
comparative fitness of applicants for office, position and promotion, and of selecting,
appointing and promoting those found to be best fitted.
id.
TFor discussion of the "strong mayor" model of municipal government, see generally
J. BAKER, URBAN PoLrics IN AmmucA 176-78 (1971); A. BROwrAGE, INTRODUCTION TO
MuNlciPA, Gov=haaNT AND A iImmsRATIoN 273-77 (1957); 3 E. McQuILrN, Tha
LAW or MuNrCI AL CoPnomTioNs § 12.43 (3d rev. ed. 1973); W. WnrER, THE URBAN
Pory 235-39, 280-81 (1969).
SIND. CODE § 18-1-6-2 (Burns 1974).
OThe development of "strong mayor" government came in answer to an earlier model
of mayor-council government which concentrated power in the hands of the council. While
publicly acknowledged as the head of city government, the weak mayor found himself
unable to control the government he was supposed to be leading. There was no central
authority, and bossism was too frequently the answer to the power vacuum at the top.
J. BAKER, URBAN PoLrcs IN AmRCA 173-75 (1971). See A. BROMAGE, INTRODUCTXON
To MUNicIPAL GovERNMENT Aim ADmunsTRATIoN 260-64 (1957).
1 OThis note does not propose that the city attorney represent the mayor himself, in
opposition to the attorney's duty to represent the city as represented by the mayor. Reference
to the mayor is, of course, made to his official capacity as chief executive of the municipality.
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prosecution of ordinance violations, drafting of legal documents, and
advising the mayor and the city's departments," are performed in
furtherance of the executive function. In fact, the close relationship
between the mayor and the city attorney is formalized in the structure
of municipal government, which places the legal department within the
executive branch." The mayor is thus allowed to choose his legal
advisor and to determine his tenure.' 3
However, the statute creating the position of city attorney directs
the attorney to advise all branches and departments of the city's govern-
ment. 4 The city attorney is thus statutorily-required to advise not only
the mayor but also the common council. This situation presents the city
attorney with a clear conflict-it is inevitable that the mayor and city
council will clash over issues on which the attorney will have been
asked to advise both entities. 5
"IIND. CODE § 18-1-6-13 (Burns 1974).
Department of law-City attorney-Appointment and bond-Powers and duties--
Assistants--Judgments against city, how enforced.-The head of the department
of law in every city shall be the attorney and counsel of such city. He shall be
appointed by the mayor ....
He shall have the management, charge and control of the law business of such
city and for each branch of its government, shall prosecute all violators of city
ordinances, shall be the legal advisor of all its departments and officers, shall
draw up ordinance, leases, deeds, contracts or other legal papers for such city
and its various departments, when requested to do so by the proper officer, shall
be the custodian of the papers properly appertaining to his office, and shall turn
the same over to his successor in office. He shall conduct all legal proceedings
authorized by this act, and all appeals of every nature whatsoever in which such
city or the public shall have an interest, shall make all searches and examine all
abstracts of title required in opening, widening or changing any street, alley or public
place, or required in any public work of any kind ....
Id.
12IND. CODE § 18-1-6-4 (Burns 1974).
The following executive departments are hereby established in cities of the first,
second, third and fourth classes:
a. Department of finance.
b. Department of law.
c. Department of public works.
d. Department of public safety.
e. Department of assessment and collection.
f. Department of public health and charities.
Id.
'"The mayor has the power to appoint the city attorney in each of the
five classes of Indiana cities. See IND. CODE §§18-2-1-4.2(a); 18-2-1-4.4; 18-2-1-5;
18-2-1-6; 18-4-7-5 (Burns 1974). The power to dismiss is given the mayor by IND. CODE
§ 18-1-6-2 (Burns 1974).
See generally 2A C.J. AiimxAu, LocAL GovmzxENTr LAw: MumcAx.L GoVE MENT
Law § 22.22 (1974); 4 E. McQumrw, THm LAw OF MuiciPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.12
(3d rev. ed. 1973).
1 4See IND. CODE § 18-1-6-13 (Burns 1974).
'
5 See State ex rel. Cleveland City Council v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, 40
Ohio App. 2d 299, 318 N.E.2d 889 (1974).
[Vol. 51:788
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The statute which places the city attorney in the role of advisor
to all16 gives him no guidance as to whom he owes his primary allegianc&
While it is possible that he might attempt to represent a self-generated
conception of the "city," the "strong mayor" form of municipal govern-
ment in Indiana, particularly as evidenced by the mayor's power of
appointment, would seem to assure that the city attorney will ultimately
advocate the policies of the mayor and the executive branch.'7
Such an eventuality is suggested by the opinions of practicing city
attorneys." - Although one thought that "as city attorney you must look
16This role is a common one for city attorneys. See Kennedy, LegoJ Services and
Reguiatory Procedures, in MANAGmNo MoDmE Crry 403 (J. Banovetz ed. 1971):
Under statutes and charters, the attorney is the legal advisor to the municipality.
As such, one of his most important functions, if not the most important, is
that of serving as advisor to the council, the administration, to boards and
commissions, and, indirectly, to the citizens of the municipality. . . . This ad-
visory function is exercised in both formal and informal ways, and when
properly utilized, permeates the entire governmental structure.
Id. at 405-06.
17 See Fed. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., The Government Client and Confidentiality:
Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. BAR J. 71 (1973):
The more usual situation of the federally employed lawyer, however, is that of
the lawyer who is a principal legal officer of a department, agency or other legal
entity of the Government, or a member of the legal staff of the department,
agency, or entity. This lawyer assumes a public trust, for the government, over-all
and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our democracy with its
representative form of government. Each part of the government has the
obligation of carrying out, in the public interest, its assigned responsibility in
a manner consistent with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regu-
lations. In contrast, the private practitioner represents the client's personal
or private interest. In pointing out that the federally employed lawyer thus is
engaged professionally in the furtherance of a particular governmental responsi-
bility we do not suggest, however, that the public is the client as the client
concept is usually understood. It is to say that the lawyer's employment requires
him to observe in the performance of his professional responsibility the public
interest sought to be served by the governmental organization of which he is a part.
Proceeding upon the foregoing background, the client of the federally employed
lawyer, using the term in the sense of where lies his immediate professional obli-
gation and responsibility, is the agency where he is employed, including those.-
charged with its administration insofar as they are engaged in the conduct of
the public business.
Id. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
'
8 The following questions were mailed to 52 Indiana city attorneys in preparation
for this note. Fifty-eight percent of the attorneys responded [survey on file with the
INDANA LAw JouRNAL]. The author acknowledges their cooperation with gratitude.
1. Is the position of city attorney a full-time position?
2. If not, how many hours a week do you spend on city matters?
3. Do you have a private practice in addition to your work for the city?
4. Does the city attorney have any assistant attorneys assigned to him/her?
S. Are there other attorneys employed by the city to work with specific
agencies or boards in your city?
6. If so, how many, and with which groups do they work?
7. Do you see the role of city attorney to be primarily that of a mediator?
an advisor? an advocate? Why?
8. Is the position of city attorney considered in your city to be that of a
spokesman for the city's administrative branch?
1976]
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out for the city as a whole,"' 9 another attorney, discussing a conflict
between a city board and the city administration, acknowledged reality
with this comment: "Should this matter continue, the board will have
to hire its own attorney to sue the city. This staff cannot possibly sue the
administration it represents."'  A third attorney summed up the situ-
ation, stating that: "[S] ince the city attorney is appointed by the mayor
and serves at his discretion, he must represent the city's interest as repre-
sented by the mayor and the Board of Public Works and Safety."'"
Clearly, this problem of self-perception is a factor which cannot be
ignored in formulating the city attorney's proper role.
In light of the conflicts inherent in the duties of the city attorney,
the Indiana General Assembly appears to have taken the initiative in
recasting his role. The legislature, in a relatively recent enactment,
empowered the common council to hire "one or more competent attor-
neys . ..on terms which the common council may deem appropriate"
in order to furnish "legal assistance for common councils." 22 This grant
9. Have you ever been involved in litigation between a city board or commission
and the city?
10. If yes, what were the circumstances? Which party did you represent? By
whom was the other party represented? How did you choose which party
to represent?
11. If no, are you aware of such litigation involving others? Please describe any
such situation.
12. If you have not been involved in such litigation, have you seen situations
in which it might have occurred? Please describe them.
13. If yes, how did you avoid those situations?
19 Response to survey, id.
The concept of public service was frequently mentioned by the attorneys. Several
indicated to the author that they regard the work they do as city attorneys to be in
fulfillment of the attorney's obligation to use his special skills for the public good.
Certainly, as one lawyer pointed out, the financial compensation received is not sufficient
to explain the hours devoted to the work.
201d. See generally Weinstein, Some Ethkal and Political Problems of a Government
Attorney, 18 MAnm L. Rv. 155 (1966).
21Response to survey, supra note 18.
Several attorneys pointed out that the city attorney's position as a member of the
Board of Public Works and Safety automatically classifies him as an administration
spokesman. So the attorney identified as the representative of all the city has been,
in reality, assigned to one segment.
22ND. CODE § 18-2-3.5-1 (Burns 1974).
Legal assistance for common councils authorized.-The common council of
any city is hereby empowered to hire or contract with, or on a full-time or part-
time basis, one or more competent attorneys and/or legal research assistants on
terms which the common council may deem appropriate.
(a) The provisions of this chapter [18-2-3.5-11 shall not apply to any
cities in which the common councils are required by law to select the city attorney.
(b) The appointment of an attorney pursuant to this section shall in no way
eliminate the office or duties of city attorney as may now or hereafter be provided
for by any law of this state.
(c) The appropriation for the payment of the salaries of such attorneys
and/or legal research assistants as fiay be employed by the common council may
[Vol. 51:783
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of authority may indicate a legislative awareness of the difficulties of
the city attorney's position and the resulting need for independent legal
advice for the common council.
Unfortunately, the legislature clouded the relationship and division
of responsibilities between the two attorneys (city attorney and common
council attorney) by adding to the same statute a qualifying section
which states that "[t]he appointment of an attorney pursuant to this
section shall in no way eliminate the office or duties of city attorney.
." This clause, when read together with the statute which creates
the office of city attorney and grants to that position a seemingly
exhaustive set of legal duties (including the duty to advise all depart-
ments and officers of the city),24 could be interpreted to mean that the city
attorney retains his responsibility for rendering legal advice to the com-
mon council despite the council's statutory power to hire its own attorney.
This interpretation, however, produces an undesirable duplication of
functions, a duplication which the legislature presumably would not
sanction at the municipal level.
2 5
The problem of duplication of functions could be avoided, on the
other hand, by a literal and restrictive reading of the statutes. Such a
reading would emphasize the city attorney's hegemony in the "law busi-
ness" of the city, and would make him ultimately responsible for advising
the common council. The attorney for the common council would be
relegated to the task of offering advice supplementary to that given by
the city attorney. It seems highly unlikely that the legislature would
have adopted such a circuitous method for supplementing the resources
of the city attorney,28 when it could simply have empowered him to hire
additional staff attorneys as needed.
On balance, the most satisfactory interpretation of this recent stat-
ute is that its primary purpose was to allow the common council to
appoint its own attorney on its own terms, thereby eliminating the
influence of the mayor and obtaining for itself the benefit of indepen-
dent legal advice. The statute supports this conclusion, since it denies
the common council the power to appoint its own attorney in those situ-
not exceed that which is appropriated for similar salaries in the budget of the
city attorney.
Id.
23IND. CoD§18-2-3.5-1(b) (Burns 1974) (emphasis added).
2 4 See IxD. CODE § 18-1-6-13 (Burns 1974).
25See 1970 TIm. A~r'y GF. ANN. REP. 91.
26To give to the city council the authority to ensure that the city attorney's staff
is adequate to meet the council's needs would invite inefficiencies, since the city attorney
is in the best position to know the needs of his office. The redundancy which might
result would be contrary to the public policy of Indiana. See id.
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ations in which the common council is required to itself select the city
attorney2 -- situations in which the mayor's influence over the city
attorney would be far less than in the typical case in which the mayor
selects the city attorney.23
Any possible conflict between this interpretation and the require-
ment that the appointment of the common council's attorney "shall in
no way eliminate the . . .duties of [the] city attorney ... 29 may be
resolved by viewing this stipulation as merely a savings clause. The
legislative intent to provide independent counsel for the common council
is clear from the caption and body of that section of the statute;80 the
addition of the clause discussed above is in keeping with legislative
apprehension of conflicting legislation, and could easily have been ap-
pended without consideration for the possible interplay of the statutory
provisions.
Interpreted in this manner, the statute evinces a legislative aware-
ness of political reality, and a recognition that the Indiana city attorney
acts and should act as the legal arm of the mayoral and the executive
2 7 See IrN. CoDo § 18-2-3.5-1(a) (Burns 1974).2 8See note 6 supra & text accompanying.
29IrN. CODE §18-2-3.5-1(b) (Burns 1974).
3oSee note 22 sura.3 1This close identification of the attorney with the mayor is not without problems.
There is in every attorney-client relationship the difficulty of maintaining the proper
balance in the attorney's service to the client. The attorney is hired to advise the client
of the best legal means for reaching the client's goals, and in doing so the attorney becomes,
to some extent, an extension of the client. The other aspect of the attorney's service
is the application to the problem at hand of his independent legal judgment. He must
retain some distance between himself and the client so that he can bring that judgment
to bear. The difficulty, then, becomes knowing which aspect of the attorney's role must
take precedence in a given situation.
Suppose, for example, that the mayor seeks the city attorney's legal advice before
undertaking some course of action. The attorney finds that the mayor's proposed plan
is legally correct. He does not, however, believe it to be a wise plan. The attorney's
response in this situation should be to support the mayor's proposal, and to design the
best legal method of accomplishing this goal. The city attorney's responsibility in this
situation is not to formulate policy but rather to implement the desires of the adminis-
tration he represents. If he has in good conscience decided that these goals are legally
legitimate, then he should concentrate his energies on providing the legal tools to accom-
plish them. There is no conflict of interest present here.
The situation is much different, however, if the attorney finds the course of action
advocated by the mayor to be legally impermissable. This situation presents a more
complicated problem for the city attorney. He can no longer consider himself an exten-
sion of the client; the introduction of the plan's illegality adds a new dimension. The
attorney must now concentrate upon his own personal and ethical responsibilities. There
is a point at which the attorney should decide that his "duty" to his client cannot override
his own ethical obligation not to support an illegal course of action. He can divorce
himself personally from the mayor's actions and support those actions when his
disagreement is only with the policy decisions involved, but he cannot so divorce
himself when his support of the mayor would require him to violate his own ethical code.
Faced with this conflict of interests, the attorney will have to abandon his accustomed
role as representative of the mayor and administration. This is the point at which the
[Vol. 51:788
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branch of municipal government. The adoption of this interpretation
as the statutory model for the Indiana city attorney would remove the
potential conflicts of interest facing the city attoriney by freeing him
from the ambiguities of his position within municipal government and
allowing him to freely assume a partisan position on behalf of the mayor.
While the statutes may be read to assign the city attorney this freedom,
the ethical standards of the legal profession must also be considered.
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA
The Code of Professional Responsibility, embodying the ethical
duties of the attorney," is concerned not only with the fair operation
of the legal system, but also with the appearance of fair operation.s
Since an attorney is both a public representative of the legal system and
an officer of the court.34 his actions must comport with standards of
apparent as well as actual fairness. Thus, the city attorney who feels
that he has resolved to his own satisfaction any ethical problems raised
by his position must nevertheless ask what impression his actions create
in the public mind. 5
attorney's personal obligations must control over his duty to his client. This solution
is necessary to the integrity of the legal system-the attorney's obligations as an officer
of that system prevent him from furthering illegal actions, even when these actions
are undertaken by a client. While the attorney serves the client, he is not permitted
to serve him at the expense of his own ethical obligations.32The Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969, became effective as the ethical guide
for ABA members on January 1, 1970. On March 8, 1971, the Indiana Supreme Court
adopted Admission and Disciplinary Rule 23, which provides that:
Grounds for discipline and disciplinary action shall be conduct that violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility . . . heretofore adopted by this Court as well
as the standards or rules of legal and judicial ethics or professional responsibility
adopted from time to time by this Court.
Id.
As the Preliminary Statement of the Code explains:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with
the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody
the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary
Rules are derived. The Ethical Considerations are inspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely
for guidance in many specific situations. The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical
Considerations, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the
-minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action.
Preiminary Statement, ABA COon O PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY.8 &e ABA CODE OF PRoPEssIoKAL PSONSI UrITr Canon 9.
4Id. at Canons 7 and 9.
5sThe problem of the apparent fairness of the legal system occurs frequently,
particularly in situations in which the attorney finds himself, as the city attorney often
does, playing multiple roles. It is difficult for the attorney to maintain even the appearance
of the impartial decisionmaker.
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The Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes the attorney
that in representing a "corporation or similar entity," he owes his loy-
alty to the entity as a whole, and should not be influenced by "the per-
sonal desires of any person or organization." 8 An unbending adherence
to this directive might require the city attorney to transcend the political
realities of his role as a mayor's appointee and to serve as impartial
counsel to all branches of city government. A narrow construction of
the Code on this point, however, might avoid troubling ethical difficulties.
A municipal corporation, unlike its nonpolitical counterpart, is not
generally expected to be composed of divisions which share a common
sense of directiorn and which are governed by a single set of overriding
policy decisions. Rather, the branches of a municipal corporation can
be expected to experience frequent clashes over policy;17 out of that
conflict, our political faith asserts, comes the democratic choice."8
It is therefore unlikely that an attorney could accurately predict
the "best interests" of the municipality. Even were a city attorney to
make such an attempt, his political ties to the mayor's office89 would
render his position suspect in the public eye. The public may easily doubt
the integrity of a legal system in which there appears to be such a chasm
between theory and practice.40 Although the mere fact that such a chasm
exists does not demand a reinterpretation of ethical standards, such a
The court in Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583
(D.C. Cir. 1970), commenting upon the actions of a commissioner who had made public
statements about a matter pending before the Commission, wrote:
Conduct such as this may have the effect of entrenching a Commissioner in a
position which he has publicly stated, making it difficult, if not impossible, for him
to reach a different conclusion in the event he deems it necessary to do so after
consideration of the record.
Id. at 590.
See, e.g., American Cyanimid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc.
v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 381
U.S. 739 (1965); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). See also
K. DAVIs, AomausnzsATvE LAW Text §§ 12.01-.02 (1972); Rogge, An Overview of Admin-
istrative Due Process, Parts I & HI, 19 VIL. L. Rzv. 1, 197 (1973); Simon, Administrative
Procedure, 43 Wis. B. BuL_. 42 (Feb. 1970); Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative
Process, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1964); Comment, Procedural Due Process and the Separa-
tion of Functions in State Occupational Licensing Agencies, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 833; 48 'Tmms
L. REV. 1385 (1970).36ABA CODE Or PROFESSioNAL REsPoNsIBnILI EC 5-18.37See Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. BAR J.
331 (1974) for a discussion of difficulties faced by government counsel (there in the
context of the federal government).
38 See generally D. TRumAN, Tim GOVEzRwENTAL PRocEss (1951).
3S9 ee notes 6-13 supra & text accompanying.
4OABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmrLITYr EC 8-8 warns the public officer against
involvement in situations in which his "personal or professional interests" may conflict
with his official duties. The city attorney who is closely tied to the mayor, while statutorily-
charged with a duty to all, may appreciate the difficulties warned against.
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reinterpretation seems warranted where it must always appear to the
public that the ethical standard cannot be met.
It is apparent that in this respect the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility must be narrowly construed.4' The call to represent the entity,
while it may be mandatory in other circumstances, here merely operates
to sow confusion in the mind of the attorney and the public.42 If the
Code is interpreted to mean that the city attorney represents the city
executive as an entity, such confusion is avoided. The public will under-
stand the attorney's responsibilities to the executive and the mayor far
more easily than it will understand the city attorney's supposed role
as the brooding omnipresence of city government. Practical safeguards
here will far more effectively protect the legal system than will a broad
appeal to the conscience.
CONCLUSION
This note has explored the difficulties which inhere in the present
function of the Indiana city attorney's office. The "globalist" conception
of that office, which requires the city attorney to serve, insofar as he
can, all branches of the city government, has given rise to ethical prob-
lems. Within the structure of municipal government, in addition, there
are dysfunctions which may result from such an expansive view of the
attorney's role.
41 See Teschner, Lawyer Morality, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 789 (1970): "Probably the
most troublesome feature of any code of professional conduct is that it consists of general,
fictional propositions which are intended to be applied to particular, factual situations."
Id. at 794.
4 2 The conflicts of interest and ethical problems inherent in the current statutory role
of the city attorney were brought into sharper focus during litigation surrounding the
procedures for disciplining Indiana city police and firemen. See City of Mishawaka v.
Stewart, - Ind. - , 310 N.E.2d 65 (1974), superseding City of Mishawaka,
Ind. App. - , 291 N.E.2d 900 (1973); City of Gary v. Gause, - Ind. App.-,
317 N.E.2d 887 (1974); Guido v. City of Marion, - Ind. App. - , 280 N.E.2d 81
(1972). A disciplinary hearing procedure (In. CoDE § 18-1-11-3 (Burns 1974)) was estab-
lished to eradicate the spoils system under which a newly elected mayor could arbitrarily
dismiss police and fire officers. See State ex rel. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 641-44, 180
N.E.2d 596, 598 (1932).
By statute, the city attorney may sit on the Board of Public Works and Safety, which
decides the innocence or guilt of the officer. See INn. CoDE §§ 18-2-1-4.2(b); 18-2-14.4;
18-2-1-5; 18-2-1-6 (Burns 1974). Another statute provides that the city attorney should
also prosecute the case. IND. CODE § 18-1-6-13 (Burns 1974). In City of Mishawaka v.
Stewart, the Indiana Supreme Court found this dual judge-advocate participation by the
city attorney to be a denial of due process. The court also viewed the arrangement as
a violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which counsels
attorneys to avoid even the appearance of impropritey.
Although the narrow holding of the case is only that the city attorney may not play
both roles, the Stewart court strongly intimated that the city attorney's proper role is
that of advocate.
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This note suggests that municipal- government would be better
served by a reinterpretation of the city attorney's statutory and ethical
duty. Assigning him a role as representative of the city executive would
be far more consistent with the realities of Indiana municipal govern-
ment, and would free the attorney from the dilemmas posed by his
present ambiguous posture.
CHRISTINA McKEE
